This paper introduces a novel corporate financial vulnerability index that tracks financial conditions of the non-financial corporate sector. Using the balance sheet information of 14,207 listed non-financial firms in 69 emerging markets and developing economies, the index shows that, at the global level, corporate vulnerability sharply increased since 2013 and stabilized in 2016. Regional trends are more heterogeneous, pointing to significant corporate vulnerabilities in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as well as a deterioration of firms' financial conditions in Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years. The energy sector has exhibited the fastest deterioration, especially since 2014, in part driven by the decline in oil prices. However, if currently relatively benign global funding conditions and higher commodity prices endure, companies may have an opportunity to strengthen their balance sheets. The paper also finds that the index has leading indicator properties for socioeconomic outcomes, such as a rise in unemployment and an economic recession, and outperforms a commonly used "debt at risk" approach.
Introduction
Corporate debt in many emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) has risen significantly since the global financial crisis 1 (IMF 2015) , raising concerns about financial stability and spillover risks to the real sector. This paper introduces the Corporate Vulnerability Index (CVI), a novel country monitoring framework that tracks financial conditions of the non-financial corporate sector in EMDEs. Using readily available balance-sheet information of listed nonfinancial firms, the CVI is based on seven indicators 2 which capture four key dimensions of firms' financial vulnerabilities: debt service capacity, leverage, rollover risk, and economic performance.
In recent years, a growing literature has attempted to quantify corporate financial vulnerabilities in EMDEs (Financial Stability Board, 2015; IMF, 2015 IMF, , 2016a IMF, , 2017 IIF 2015 and 2017; World Bank, 2016; Beltran et al, 2016) . While most of these studies assess vulnerabilities in terms of the interest coverage ratio (ICR) and leverage, some also consider corporate vulnerability along other dimensions, such as maturity mismatches (e.g. Gonzalez-Miranda, 2012; Rodrigues Bastos et al, 2015; Alfaro et al, 2017) , and find that firms have changed their leverage and maturity structure between 2000 and 2013 to take advantage of benign global financial conditions. However, this literature focuses on a relatively small sample of firms in a select number of countries.
Our paper is related and contributes to the literature in several respects. First, we propose a novel vulnerability index which extends the widely-used concept of "Debt at Risk" (see for example IMF, 2016a) . Debt at risk is the total amount of debt in a country (or industry) associated with firms which are deemed financially vulnerable, typically for firms with an ICR below a threshold. Our contribution is to apply this concept across multiple financial vulnerability indicators since firms can be financially vulnerable across multiple dimensions at the same time.
The CVI appears to have leading indicator qualities; an increase in the CVI tends to be associated with a future economic recession and an increase in unemployment. Our findings also suggest the CVI is more informative for future socio-economic outcomes compared to the commonly used Debt at Risk approach based on ICR (IMF, 2017; FSB, 2015) .
The CVI is related to a large literature on corporate default modeling based on accounting data (e.g. Altman, 1968) and distance-to-default or contingent claim models based on market prices inspired by Merton (1974) . Unlike the CVI, these models however require default and price data which are not readily available for a wide range of countries and/or firms. Another important advantage of our balance-sheet-based approach is that it can easily be extended to cover nonlisted firms.
We also add to the "early warning" literature which suggests corporate debt overhangs can be a leading indicator of crises and growth slowdowns as well as having the effect of amplifying shocks (for Europe: Goretti and Souto, 2013; Aiyar et al., 2015; Bergthaler et al. 2015; for emerging markets: IMF, 2015; Lindner and Jung, 2014 3 See World Bank (2016), IMF (2015) , IIF (2015) , BIS (2015) and Geneva Report (2015) . 4 Becker and Ivanshina (2014), Cortina, Didier and Schmukler (2016) . For details on the evolution and financial threats of corporate indebtedness, see Acharya et al (2015) . 
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Source: IMF GFSR (October, 2015) Source: IMF GFSR (October, 2015) In the current global environment, questions have been raised about the financial stability risks of the corporate sector in EMDEs and the potential spillover effects on their financial sectors as corporations may face tightening in the global financial conditions and/or lower and more volatile commodity prices.
The Corporate Vulnerability Index
The CVI is a composite indicator that assesses non-financial corporate vulnerability in emerging and developing economies (EMDEs). Based on corporates' balance-sheet information, the CVI The CVI is based on the concept of "Debt at Risk" (DaR), the total amount of outstanding debt in a country (or industry) associated with firms that are deemed financially vulnerable. DaR is an attractive concept to track corporate vulnerabilities since it exposes both the risk and magnitude present in the tail of the firm's distribution, as opposed to other methodological approaches such as calculating averages or medians of (normalized) firm vulnerability indicators. Specifically, we define as the share of corporate debt in a country that is considered vulnerable according to indicator Y at time t and country c: We use 1 as a threshold for ICR since firms with profits less than interest expenses are immediately highly vulnerable. This threshold is more conservative than those in other studies, but we find that a value of 1 provides consistent results. For Leverage Ratio, Net Debt to EBIT Ratio, and Current to Long-Term Liabilities, the vulnerability thresholds correspond to the 90 th percentile value of the respective indicators for all firms within the same industry and across countries. By pooling by industry and across time (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) and countries, we focus on industry-specific effects and abstract from time and country effects. Similarly, for Quick Ratio, 8 Return on Assets, and Market to Book Ratio, the respective thresholds are equal to the 10 th percentile value of the indicator by industry.
We extend the notion of to multiple indicators which allows us to measure the "intensity" of debt at risk. We do so by focusing on debt of firms for which multiple indicators signal financial vulnerability at the same time. The underlying assumption is that debt that is associated with firms that are contemporaneously vulnerable according to multiple indicators is more risky. We operationalize this notion by defining . The captures the proportion of total corporate debt in a country that is held by firms that are vulnerable according to X or more indicators at the same time, where ∈ [0,7]:
. (7) is designed to exhibit a stronger signal-to-noise ratio compared to . The CVI is calculated as the average of for country c and time t:
where 0 ≤ ≤ 1.
The definition has an intuitive graphical interpretation. As illustrated in Figure 3 , the CVI is equivalent to the normalized area under the curve (the area under blue line). At the extremes, if no firm is financially vulnerable according to any indicator, then the value of the area under the curve (and the CVI) is equal to zero (i.e. equivalent to the area under the green line).
In contrast, if all firms are financially vulnerable with respect to all seven indicators, then the area under the curve (and the value of CVI) would be equal to one (i.e. equivalent to the area under the red line). In practice and as expected, the CVI has values well below one; the sample mean is 0.11 with a maximum of 0.51.
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Figure 3: Corporate Vulnerability Index and Area Under the Curve
Our framework is underpinned by simplifying assumptions. The concept does not differentiate between indicators and treats them as interchangeable and of equal weight. While the credit scoring literature referenced earlier focuses on assessing indicator weights, these models are typically applied to a specific country or industry and require corporate default data.
In the absence of such data for a large sample of countries, and to ensure wide applicability and transparency of the CVI, our approach is more pragmatic. Note also that the CVI de facto applies a greater weight on the debt of more vulnerable firms since the area under the curve is cumulative (i.e. is always 100 percent). In other words, the debt of a firm which is vulnerable according to seven indicators weighs seven times more than the debt of a firm that is vulnerable according to only one indicator.
Data
We use balance-sheet information of 14,273 listed non-financial companies from 8 industries and It is important to highlight a few data limitations. First, our sample only covers listed non-financial firms. In most EMDEs listed firms are usually the biggest companies (by assets) and/or have better access to funding sources. This may bias our results, but we believe that information from listed companies, which generally also follow better accounting practices, nevertheless provides a good proxy of the general health of the overall non-financial corporate sector, in particular with regards to potential banking distress. 9 Second, we do not have information about corporates' financial information by currency and are therefore not able to accurately assess currency risks and external vulnerabilities. This is a general concern, as neither Bloomberg nor any other data source consistently collects this type of information on a cross-country basis. Finally, our data set does not contain information on derivatives, other risk management tools and counterparties which could be helpful to better understand exposures and transmission channels of corporate risk. 
Association between the Corporate Vulnerability Index and Socio-Economic Outcomes
Financial vulnerability in the non-financial corporate sector can have significant macroeconomic consequences as corporate distress may adversely impact the financial sector (e.g. through increases in non-performing loans, larger volatility of asset prices, rise of borrower risk); the public sector (e.g. through lower tax revenues, potential public support in case of public nonfinancial firms); other firms (e.g. through financial and/or trade interlinkages); and households (e.g. through the labor market).
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This section investigates the leading indicator properties of the CVI with regards to socioeconomic outcomes. We use weighted logit regression models to establish whether an increase in unemployment; a GDP recession; or a reduction in welfare is associated with an increase in the Corporate Vulnerability Index CVI t , subject to controls (X j ):
The respective dependent variables of the three logit regressions are three dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if (1) the unemployment rate increases from one year to the next;
12 See Gray et al (2006) , and Ruscher and Wolff (2012) . (2) the annual GDP growth rate is negative (i.e., GDP recession); or (3) the annual per capita GDP is negative (i.e., Welfare reduction), and zero otherwise.
The independent variables are the CVI and a set of control variables. We also include year dummies and weigh each observation by the ratio of the total sum of common shares of the firms in our sample to stock market capitalization in each country, which we use as a proxy for the representativeness of the CVI in a country. The CVI and control variables enter the regression lagged by one period to ameliorate endogeneity concerns.
The macro-economic control variables are the current account balance, general government balance, government debt, real GDP per capita, and inflation rate. We further control for the commonly used DaR based on the ICR to test whether the CVI contains additional information. suggesting that CVI has stronger predictive power for socio-economic outcomes. The CVI is correctly signed in all model specifications and, with the exception of the welfare specification, remains significant even when including macroeconomic controls.
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The first three columns of Panel A directly test the predictive power of the CVI. Panel A Column 1 shows that, based on the results of the marginal effects on the median, a one-unit increase of CVI from the median is associated with a rise in the probability of unemployment by 1.78
percentage points one year later. 14 In other words, if CVI goes from its median value of 0.15 to 0.16, the probability of unemployment rise will increase 0.0178 percentage points. Column 1 also shows the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC) of 0.73, which means that the CVI has reasonable predictive accuracy for a future rise in unemployment.
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The results of Panel A Column 2 show that a one-unit increase of CVI from the median is associated with an increase in the probability of a recession next year by 0.91 percentage points.
The AUC is 0.86 suggesting that the CVI has strong predictive accuracy power. Finally, Panel A 13 Information for Macedonia is not included in the logit estimations for unemployment rise as the dynamics of unemployment in that country in recent years are explained by policies targeting vocational training and on-the-job training under different government stimulus programs. As explained by the IMF's Article IV (2016b), Macedonia has one of the highest unemployment rates in emerging Europe (25.4% in 2016), mostly reflecting skills shortage and mismatch resulting from emigration of skilled workers and low level of education. Since 2008, overall unemployment rate has declined by 10 percentage points, with lower unemployment rates in groups like workers with vocational training and tertiary education. 14 In logit models, as the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients are important to determine the statistical relationship between the probability of the outcome (in this case unemployment rise) and the independent variables, the values of the coefficients have a difficult interpretation in economic terms. The coefficients of the marginal effects have an economic interpretation as they measure the change in predicted probability of outcome when the independent variables change in one unit. 15 The area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC) is a measure that that reflects how well a model is able to correctly classify a binary outcome variable. The ROC compares the proportion of cases in which the model specification correctly predicts the result of the outcome variable (i.e. true positive rate) versus the proportion of cases in which the model specification incorrectly predicts the result of the outcome variable (i.e. false positive rate). The AUC goes from 0 to 1, where the value 0 represents that the true positive rate is 0 percent and the false positive rate is 100 percent, and a value of 1 represents that the true positive rate is 100 percent and the false positive rate is 0 percent. The closer the AUC is to 1, the better the model. The AUC of a random classifier is 0.5.
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Column 3 establishes that the probability of welfare reduction (i.e., fall in GDP per capita) goes up by 0.78 percentage points when the lagged CVI rises one unit from the median. The AUC is 0.81.
The last three columns of Panel A control for macroeconomic variables. The results indicate that the coefficients of CVI are still positive and statistically significant. In other words, our CVI captures relevant features related to the corporate sector which are distinct from general macroeconomic conditions. As shown in Panel A column 4, the probability of a future rise in unemployment increases by 1.36 percentage points when the CVI rises one unit from its median value. Similarly, Panel A column 5 shows that the probability of a recession rises 1.02 percentage points when CVI goes up one unit from its median. The AUC increase to a very high 0.9 when macroeconomic variables are included. Finally, Panel A column 6 shows that the probability of a welfare reduction rises 0.66 percentage points with a change in CVI in one unit from the median.
Interestingly, the AUC is only marginally affected by the inclusion of macroeconomic controls, suggesting that the model's predictive classification power is mostly derived from the CVI.
Panel B shows that the coefficients of CVI are still positive and statistical significant after including the commonly used DaR based on ICR which is insignificant in all specifications. This finding suggests that the CVI contains empirically relevant additional information compared to the DaR based on ICR. Note that the correlation between DaR based on ICR and the CVI is relatively high (0.71). However, the size of the CVI coefficient and statistical significance do not change dramatically (with the exception of Column 6) due to the inclusion of the DaR based on ICR, suggesting collinearity is not an overriding concern.
Sensitivity Analysis to Different ICR Thresholds
Our results are consistent under different thresholds for ICR. Using ICR thresholds 1.5, 2, and 3, we recalculated the CVI to evaluate how sensitive our results are to thresholds commonly used in the literature (FSB, 2015; IMF, 2017) .
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As shown in the Appendix, Table B1 , the country ranking does not have much variability under different ICR thresholds, particularly for both the top 10 and the bottom 15 countries. In addition, Tables B2, B3 , and B4 show the logit regressions for unemployment rise, recession, and welfare reduction, respectively, using the CVI modified by different levels of ICR thresholds. The results
show that the estimated coefficient for the CVI is positive and statistically significant in all cases. At the industry level, we find that energy-linked sectors in particular have experienced rising financial vulnerabilities; especially since the 2014 peak in global oil prices. We also find that debt of non-financial listed firms in EMDEs has increased both in level and in riskiness: EMDEs' corporate debt rose by 46 percent, from US $2.6 trillion in 2010 to US $3.8 trillion in 2016. Over the same period, debt in the hands of firms that are considered financially vulnerable in at least one indicator grew by 120 percent, from $1 trillion to $2.2 trillion. In 2016, approximately 58 percent is considered at risk according to at least one indicator.
Logit regressions suggest that the CVI has some leading indicator qualities: an increase in the CVI is positively associated with a future rise in unemployment and an economic recession. Results are robust to controlling for macroeconomic conditions. The CVI also outperforms the commonly used Debt at Risk measure based on the Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR).
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As financial vulnerabilities in non-financial corporate sectors of many EMDEs appear to be growing, it seems important to consider the efficiency of the EMDEs' institutional and policy frameworks to monitor vulnerabilities and to deal with distressed firms in case adverse shocks materialize. For instance, it is unknown whether recently established macroprudential frameworks to monitor corporate debt are effective. In addition, inadequate regulatory frameworks like deficient insolvency regimes, poor financial institutions to deal with nonperforming loans in the banking sector, or macro policies that discourage hedging of firms'
foreign currency positions might work as amplifiers of adverse shocks. Consequently, policies aimed at minimizing corporate vulnerabilities and controlling their spillover effects as well as the legal framework providing a diverse "menu" of options for ailing firms to obtain efficient financial restructuring, are vital elements of a strategy to improve the resilience of EMDEs' corporate sector to adverse shocks. 
